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TAKING STOCK 
In my frantic rush to catch up on the 
eight years of American history that I 
missed, I am often appalled by the 
studied, analytic approach to warfare 
taken by so many of the educated, 
well-intentioned individuals who di­
rected our war in Vietnam. If my 
understanding of their reasoning is to 
remain lacking, so much the better. For 
he who supports the position that war­
fare and warriors are just other things to 
which the rational concepts of business 
and economics apply is missing the 
mark. Lewis Sorley reviews Crisis in
Command in the Professional Reading 
section of this Review and I think his 
opening assessment of the book is accu­
rate: the book is flawed. Gabriel and 
Savage's little volume has been con­
demned by many as an exaggerated 
indictment of American performance in 
Vietnam; many say it is hung on a 
questionable historic framework, and 
almost all its readers agree that its 
suggested reforms are reminiscent of the 
Dark Ages. Though acknowledging all of 
that, Sorley again hits the nail on the 
liead when he adds: to dismiss this book 
for the above reasons, however, is to 
ignore the tremendous power of the 
authors' central thesis. That thesis is 
that American victory was impossible 
because our traditional fighting man's 
gladiatorial ethic had been programmed 
out of style and supplanted by an 
entrepreneurial ethic whose tools were 
based on the rational corporate model, 
systems analysis and utils. This new fad 
assumed that management and leader­
ship were synonymous. Natural out­
growths of that concept were officers' 
ticket punching, organizational "effi­
ciency" at the expense of honor, and 
ultimately a breakdown of small fight­
ing unit cohesion, spirit and integrity. 
Wars cannot be fought the same way 
bureaucrats haggle over apportionments. 
The toll of human life in battle does not 
lend itself to cost/benefit analysis. One's 
plan of action on the international chess 
board cannot be built on compromise 
businesslike decisions among factions. 
To design a country's strategy along a 
middle course for bureaucratic reasons 
is to aim at what Winston Churchill has 
called the bull's eye of disaster. That 
our country was steady on course for 
that bull's eye of disaster, even before I 
was shot down in ·September 1965, is 
evident from a reading of Admiral U.S. 
Grant Sharp's recent book Strategy for 
Defeat. By that time, the bureaucracy 
was already sending him, CINCPAC, 
waffled directives (consensus documents 
with "all factions inside the paper") 
that were not consistent with the stated 
military objectives of that same 
bureaucracy. The managerial authors of 
the war policy spoke self-assuredly in 
the language of war but their mind set 
continued to be that of faddish en­
trepreneurial gamesmen; by the time 4
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Naval power continues to offer flexibility, mobility, universality, and publfo 
acceptance to policymakers but the ordering function of military force has become 
less certain, perhaps less approprfate, as international conditions grow more complex. 
Some factors affecting the future use of naval power are discussed herein. 
THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF AMERICAN SEAPOWER 
by 
James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver 
The .. Expansion of Force." Among 
the more important of the new com· 
plexities confronting both analysis and 
policy are those surrounding the use of 
force. For almost 300 years prior to the 
end of World War II, the pursuit of 
11security" by nation-states has been the 
ce ntr al d ynamic of international 
politics, The correlative of this condi• 
tion has been an expansion of the 
capacity of the nation-state to deploy 
and use military power. During the last 
150 years of this 11expansionist phase" 1 
of the role of military power in interna­
tional politics an important paradox 
emerged: the use of military power 
could result in enormous disorder but, 
under certain circumstances, order as 
well. Maximizing the potentialities for 
order became the preoccupation of that 
essential prescription for prudential be· 
havior in an international politics based 
on the inevitability of war-the balance 
of power. A,; one of the most careful 
students of the balance of power notes: 
it " ... is not a formula for perfect 
peace, but rather for reasonable stability 
and order with no more than moderate 
use of violent techniques by the states 
involved in the system. "2 
The 20th century seems to many to 
have demonstrated the futility of 
power. Three decades of international 
disorder culminated in the skies over 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in what many 
regarded as the ultimate expansion of 
force. How, it might be asked, could 
this most immoderate of military instru­
mentalities be 41used" to foster order in 
an international system characterized by 
deep Soviet-American hostility and con­
flict? 
To post-World War II American 
realists, the period of expanding force in 
international relations has been seen as 
coming to a conclusion. It was, they 
believed, replaced by what Robert 
Osgood termed a "regulatory" phase in 6
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While U.S. leverage in Asia can no longer be taken for granted, American policy is 
still a critical factor in the stabii!ty of the area. Some U.S. initiative leading to 
coordination of that policy with the East Asian policies of Japan seems necessary to 
promote mutual objectives and to reconcile differences. 
REASSESSING THE SECURITY ALLIANCE 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
by 
Lieutenant Roger D. Wiegley 
JAG Corps, U.S. Navy 
The role of the United States in the 
security of Japan is an issue that has 
received relatively little official atten• 
tion, despite significant developments in 
Northeast Asia over the past decade. 
These developments, clearly more than 
isolated or temporary phenomena, are 
relevant to the U.S.·Japan security 
alliance in at least three respects. First, 
the U.S. commitment to Japan has, in 
Japan's perception, lost much of its 
credibility. Second, Improved relations 
between Japan and the People's Re­
public of China {PRC) raise the prospect 
of a shift in the strategic balance of 
power in Asia. And third, the Soviet 
Union has significantly increased its use 
of military forces to exert political 
pressure on Japan. Each development 
requires careful examination in terms o f  
its implications for both United States 
and Japanese interests. 
Japan's perception of the American 
commitment in Asia has been shaken by 
a series of dramatic events over the past 
10 years. Beginning with the 1969 
iiNixon Doctrine," which stated that 
conventional Asian wars would there­
after be fought by Asians, Japan wit­
nessed the evolution of the U.S. policy 
of withdrawal from Vietnam. Initially, 
Tokyo's reaction to the U.S. withdrawal 
was muted, largely because U.S. pro­
nouncements on military policy indi­
cated a shift in emphasis toward clearly 
identifiable American interests-such as 
the security of Japan. Then, early in 
1977, at the very outset of hill adminill· 
tration, President Carter announced that 
American ground forces would be with­
drawn from South Korea. The change in 
U.S. policy toward Korea caused con­
siderable apprehension in Tokyo despite 
assurances from Washington that the 
United States was not deserting any of 
its Asian allies. Not surprisingly, many 
Japanese viewed the announcement of 
withdrawal from Korea as more 20
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Do Gorshkov's writings establish or reflect Soviet naval doctrine? Is he the author 
of Soviet naval policy? Can the authoritativeness of those writings be determined, as 
some have attempted, by an examination of "key" words and phrases in those 
writings? 
THE DOCTRINAL LEGITIMACY 
OF GORSHKOV'S WRITINGS: 
MEASURING THE MEASURES 
by 
Renita Fry 
The appearance in 1976 of Admiral 
Gorshkov's book Sea Power of the State 
revived the question of whether the 
views of the Soviet Commander in Chief 
were a statement of doctrine or not. At 
the time of the publication of the 
Gorshkov series of articles in 1972-3, 
many Western commentators, relying 
heavily on their "feel" for the authori­
tativeness with which Gorshkov wrote, 
concluded that the series was part of a 
factional debate. Later, these same com­
mentators argued that the book was a 
doctrinal confirmation of the views ex­
pressed in the series. The issue is not 
merely semantic, In Soviet military 
literature, doctrine holds a unique place. 
Military doctrine is at the apex of all 
military thinking and writing. 1 t forms 
the base on which policy is formulated 
and executed. Military doctrine provides 
both the officially approved views on 
the conduct of war and the outline for 
keeping the country and its armed 
forces prepared for war. Doctrine is a 
fundamental law of the state, which 
makes it unchallengeable. All other cate­
gories of military thinking contribute to 
doctrine but are subordinate to it. 1 
Classification of Gorshkov's works as 
doctrine would mean that the opinions 
attributed to Gorshkov were the driving 
force of Soviet naval policy. A denial of 
doctrinal status would indicate lack of 
agreement concerning naval policy. 
One commentator, James McConnell, 
has consistently argued that Gorshkov's 
writings, both series and book, are more 
than a line of argument in a factional 
debate, In a paper for the Center for 
Naval Analyses, McConnell proposed 
that a more systematic measure of 
authoritativeness than the "feel" used 
by his colleagues would support his 
contention. 2 The method of evaluation 
proposed by McConnell is interesting 
because it applies to Gorshkov's writings 
the analysis of words and phrases often 29
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Admiral King was never noted for his smooth press relations but during World War 
II some two dozen Journalists came to know and respect him as few outside the 
service did-and came to believe that his contributions were too valuable to be 
forfeited, as some called for, because of mishandled public relations. 
ADMIRAL KING'S TOUGHEST BATrLE 
by 
Uoyd J. Graybar 
"In peace time," John Sorrels of the 
Scripps-Howard chain of newspapers 
stated in 1943, "the sole responsibility 
of the newspaper is to inform, to 
enlighten, to llluminate. In war time, a 
great part of the responsibility is not to 
inform, but to suppress, to guard, to 
screen information of the most interest­
ing sort." Both in and outside the 
profession of journalism there were 
many who in the name of patriotism 
would have agreed with this editor. 
After all, no loyal American wanted to 
render aid and comfort to the enemy, 
the standard which was ubiquitously 
employed to justify withholding news. 
But was the decision not to inform so 
simple to make? Sorrels realized there 
were circumstances when it was not, but 
it remained for another newspaperman, 
Palmer Hoyt, publisher of the Portland 
Oregonian, to state best the case for 
freedom of expression. "No one wants 
to violate 'necessary naval and military 
security,"' Hoyt conceded. "But by the 
same token," he continued, 
public and press alike wonder 
whether the naval and military 
establishments are awake to the 
fact that there is something 
greater than naval security, some­
thing greater than military 
security, and that is, American 
security-faith in ourselves, faith 
in our leadership, faith in our 
government! No one wants to 
help the enemy, but none can 
endorse a policy of silence if it be 
utilized to give aid and comfort to 
men responsible for our military 
or civil failures. 1 
The delicate balance that Hoyt's dis­
cerning standards required of the con• 
scientious journalist was similarly im­
posed on America's military leaders. No 
· one among them seemed less suited to
deal sensitively with the press than the 
abrasive and hot-tempered leader of the 41
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Kiev's mix of tactical V!STOL fighters and helicopters and an extensive weapons 
inventory give it capability for a variety of roles but it is here contended that its basic 
role is to protect the Soviet SSBN force. An earlier version of this paper first 
appeared in the Naval Intelligence Quarterly. 
SOVIET DOCTRINE ON TIIE ROLE 
OF TIIE AffiCRAFf CARRIER 
by 
Lieutenant Commander Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., USNR 
Introduction. At the close of World 
War II, the combined fleets of the 
United States and Great Britain in• 
eluded over 115 aircraft carriers with a 
total capacity of some 6,700 aircraft. 
Typifying their strength was the U.S. 
Navy's Task Force 38, operating off 
Japan from 10 July through 15 August 
1945. Because carrier airpower had al­
ready contributed greatly to the de­
struction of the Japanese Fleet, this 
force was free to operate within 100 
miles of the coast. Aircraft from the 
task force proceeded to devastate 
Tokyo and ranged across the Japanese 
countryside attacking targets of oppor­
tunity virtually at will. 
Like the Japanese, the Soviets had no 
fleet that could prevent a similar force 
from approaching their Siberian or 
European coasts. A 1946 article in 
Military Thought, the Soviet profes­
sional military journal, revealed the im­
pact that the Allied employment of 
carriers had made on Soviet thought: 
The conditions of modern war 
at sea demand the mandatory 
participation in the combat opera­
tions of navies of powerful carrier 
forces, using them for striking 
devastating blows against the 
naval forces of the enemy as well 
as the contest with his aviation. 
Both at sea and near one's bases, 
these tasks can only be carried out 
by carrier aviation. 1 
The primary concern of the Soviets 
in viewing the overwhelming preponder­
ance of Western aircraft carriers was 
their ability to operate against shore 
targets. Soviet capabilities to hamper 
such operations were minimal; there 
were virtually no Soviet major surface 
combatants in 1945, and while the 
Soviets possessed a numerically im­
pressive submarine fleet, individual sub­
marines had displayed a mediocre war­
time record. The greatest Soviet naval 
potential lay in river flotillas that had 
worked closely with Soviet ground 51
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Th• future program for carrier-based naval aviation has been seen to require a 
choice between a follow-on Nimitz CVN and a midi-CVV. There is an option better 
than and no more expensive than the CVV. 
TIIE 1978 CARRIER CONTROVERSY: 
WHY NOT THE KENNEDY? 
by 
Scott C. Truver 
Epitomi:ed by President Carter's 
veto of the FY 1979 Defense Au thoriza­
tion Bill and the subsequent failure of 
the House of Representatives to over• 
ride that veto, a serious controversy has 
con tinued to engulf the Navy, the De• 
partment of Defense, Cong ress, and 
White House advi.ors over the future 
program for carrier-based naval aviation. 
The veto focused national attention on 
the disputed need for spending a total 
of $2.4 billion (in FY 1979 dollars) for 
a fourth Nimitz-class nuclear-powered 
carrier that the Navy and Congress 
believed to be in America's national 
security interests. However, rather than 
buy a follow-on Nimitz, President 
Carter promised to include in his FY 
1980 request a $1.6 billion, 62,000-ton, 
conventionally propelled carrier, the 
Hmidi" cvv. 
Because the veto has result ed in a 
1-year extension of the carrier con·
trOV611lY, it would be beneficial to con­
sider all feasible conventionally
propelled aircraft carrier alternatives 
available to ensure the decision that is 
reached on the next carrier is based on a 
complete review· of all relevant informa­
tion. Such a review necessarily should 
consider the costs and capabilities of an 
updated John F. Kennedy (CV-67)· 
design large-deck carrier. Indeed, even a 
cursory examination will show that a 
modernized Kennedy-the Navy's most 
recent conventionally propelled carrier, 
commissioned in 1968-is to be pre• 
ferred over the CVV on a mission-effec­
tiveness and cOlll•effectiveness basis. 
Even more important from a domestic 
polltical perspective, the Kennedy
alternative is an elegant compromise 
that President Carter can use to bridge 
the chasm separating congressional and 
administration proponents of nuclear­
powered large altcraft carriers and those 
who favor small, less costly, conven­
tionally propelled air-capable platforms. 
And a follow-on Kennedy large-deck CV 
can be the "transition ship" Navy 62
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The political requirements for a military victory have been, at times, greater than 
a military force's ability to fulfill. A military failure, following a military prediction 
of failure, has been seen as self-fulfilling prophecy. Admiral Du Pont's experience is 
instructive. 
ADMIRAL SAMUEL F. DU PONT, 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, 
AND THE ATIACK ON CHARLESTON,APRIL 1863 
by 
Gerald S. Henig 
Gloom overshadowed the Union in 
the early spring of 1863. The military 
situation, particularly In the eastern 
theater, seemed hopeless. In December 
the Army of the Potomac had suffered a 
severe defeat at Fredericksburg, and, at 
least for the immediate future, there 
were no indications that it was ready to 
redeem itself. As Allan Nevins has noted 
in his multivolume study of the war, 
many in the North believed at this time 
that the "valor, dash, and tenacity of 
the South ... combined with high mili· 
tary leadership, might yet possibly pro­
duce a deadlock-which would mean 
Confederate success. "1 To prevent this,
the Lincoln administration, Congress, 
and northerners in general realized that 
a decisive blow would have to be leveled 
against the South. Rather than look to 
the Army, plagued by a poor combat 
record and low morale, most now 
pinned their hopes upon the Navy­
especially upon the man who had given 
the Union its first major victory, Rear 
Adm. Samuel F. Du Pont. 
Tall, handsome, aristocratic In bear­
ing, Du Pont had a distinguished lineage. 
His grandfather was the French author 
and statesman Du Pont de Nemours, a 
longtime friend of Benjamin Franklin 
and Thomas Jefferson; and Samuel's 
uncle, Eleuthere lrenee du Pont, was the 
founder of the gunpowder industry of 
Wilmington, Delaware. A close family, it 
came as no surprise and met with the 
approval of the entire "clan" when 
Samuel married his first cousin, Sophie 
Madeleine (the daughter of Eleuthere 
lrenee ), to whom he remained devoted 
throughout his life. Second only to the 
love he had for his wife was the deep 
dedication he had for his profession. In 
1817, at the age of 14, he joined the 71
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78 
SET AND DRIFT 
ASSESSING THE CAPABILITY OF NAVAL FORCES 
by 
Commander Ralph V. Buck, U.S. Navy 
Introduction. In assessing military 
capability, careful judgments by sea• 
saned military and civilian professionalll 
never can be entirely supplanted by 
mathematical analysis. However, such 
judgment can be aided and improved 
through the use qf selected quantitative 
measures and assessments. The degree to 
which this process is successful depends 
on how well it meets the needs of a 
particular assessment problem and the 
understanding that operators and ana· 
lysts have of the role of combat model­
ing. 
Historically, analysis of military 
capabilities has proceeded from the 
simple to the complex; from the 
description of physical performance 
characteristics, to single system en­
counters, to battle and theater force 
actions. Many attempts have been made 
to carry the level of detail from the 
simple to the complex by a form of 
building block, or modular, aggregation. 
Such attempts, while Intuitively appeal­
ing, are carried out at great monetary 
cost ( development, computer running 
time, etc.) and understanding (loss of 
general knowledge of model details, and 
proliferation of the number of possible 
combinations of the inputs). 
Key difficulties encountered can be 
grouped as follows: 
• Complexity of military activities
often exceeds computation capacity and 
time available to develop the model. 
• Level of detail is often aggregated
to reduce complexity, thereby biasing 
the results by the necessary assump­
tlons.1 
• Physical theory is deficient in
uniformly predicting results from initial 
conditions. Static measures such as fire­
power Indices do not easily decompose 
to show the time history of each ele­
ment 's contribution. 
• The modeling hierarchy is non•
linear in the sense that higher level 
resouroe allocation models depend on 
interaction factors developed in lower 
level models, which in turn depend on 
the output of the upper models. 
To address these difficulties, some 
assessments2 have taken a top-down 
approach, in which highly aggregated 
models develop those interaction 81
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